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PROPOSED NEW TECHNIQUES IN THE
LAW OF DIVORCE
I. FAMILY DISSOLUTION-LIMITS OF THE PRESENT
LITIGIOUS METHOD
John S. Bradwayt
D IVORCE procedure in the United States has been the sub-
ject of extensive criticism. Admittedly, many of the ob-
jections to the method now generally employed are well-founded
and could be avoided by a revision of divorce procedure and a
modification of the concept of divorce. To say that one plans to
test the social desirability of a legal concept such as divorce pro-
cedure merely puts the question one step further off. There
may be different standards of social desirability depending upon
the point of departure, the fundamental assumptions, and the
viewpoint of the inquirer. The critic has a right to knowledge
of the base of operations because only thus may he make allow-
ance for bias, appraise blind spots, and evaluate both methods
of inquiry and conclusions. The inquirer by such an orienta-
tion process is encouraged to realize that his mind may have
been warped by training and experience, or lack of it. It is to
his advantage to be careful in his approach, conservative in his
recommendations, and patient with those who disagree with him.
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
If we assume that divorce procedure is socially desirable
provided it satisfies the wishes of at least one of the interested
spouses,' the critic may complain that such a point of departure
t A.B., 1911, A.M., 1915, Haverford College; AL.B., 1914, University of
Pennsylvania. Professor of Law, University of Southern California, 1929-31.
Professor of Law, Duke University, since 1931. Author of articles in various
periodicals.
12 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAws (1932) 65: "Finally, the lay reader
should note that, despite any impression to the contrary which he may have
received from the reading of novels and newspapers, no statute now existing
names incompatibility of temper as a cause for absolute divorce." Seven
states do this In effect by providing for a divorce where the parties live
apart even voluntarily for a fixed period. But see 1938 Supp. id. at 46: "Of
particular interest are the new provisions in Alaska and New Mexico allow-
ing divorce for incompatibility of temper. Also of interest are the amend-
ments in five jurisdictions making voluntary separation for a period of years
a ground for divorce."
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is too individualistic and too impermanent to justify the inevi-
table changes in the legal system. The emotional reactions of
the parties do not improve the situation. The advice to the
lovelorn column in the daily newspapers2 is some evidence of
the interest of individuals in domestic problems. The inquirer
cannot afford to ignore this factor, but neither should he un-
reservedly or exclusively accept it.
If we assume that divorce procedure is socially desirable
provided it satisfies the wishes of a substantial majority of the
general public, we are faced with the task of ascertaining the
facts. The present keynote of public interest in divorce may
be said to be discord.' Other questions are inevitably dragged
into the discussion: whether divorce itself is socially desirable
and, therefore, to be made easier; or a menace to the solidarity
of the traditional American family and, therefore, to be re-
pressed. A poll might reveal individual preferences, but it
seems unfortunate to involve the entire project in an old con-
troversy if another approach promises improvement. The in-
quirer should be careful not to give too much credence to an im-
pression that members of the lay public are competent without
special training to "diagnose" and "prescribe for" their own
legal difficulties. In medical matters we have left such ideas
far behind. Various campaign programs have taught most of
us who are educable to take our health and accident problems to
a competent physician, rather than to select on our own initia-
tive some patent medicine or an even less orthodox panacea." A
series of "legal first aid" courses might bring home to the gen-
eral public the corresponding advantages of taking legal prob-
lems promptly to a good lawyer.
Having cast doubt upon the value of the individual spouse
and the general public to provide us with a suitable base of oper-
ations, we turn to a more likely source. Much may be said in
favor of a divorce procedure which has been pronounced so-
2 Jensen, Doris Blake Advises the Lovelorn (1941) 11 LFE 65; Palmer,
Did I Go Wrong? Advice to the Lovelorn and Perplexed, a Thriving Amer-
ican Industry (1939) 48 Am. MERCURY 197.
"Anyone making a comparative reading of our American divorce
statutes for the first time is astounded by the unnecessary variation and
vagueness of this legislative output.
"From a purely theoretical standpoint we need a simple uniform law.
But our present divorce statutes represent such divergent views upon funda-
mental points that agreement does not seem attainable except in the distant
future." 2 VERNIER, op. cit. =spra note 1, at 7.
'For one approach to the public health program, see Maslow, The Back-
ground of the Wagner National Health Bill (1939) 6 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRO.
606.
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cially desirable by the various professional groups interested in
handling and attempting to solve domestic relations problems.'
There is a chance here fbr an impersonal scientific approach.
But candor requires us to state that before any progress can be
made from an interprofessional viewpoint much work must be
done in creating such a viewpoint. The water-tight compart-
ment theory of the social sciences must be abandoned, and men
from different fields, each with his own technical skills and vo-
cabulary, each trained by a different discipline, must learn to
work harmoniously together on particular cases to achieve a
common, rather than an individual, objective.
The present paper, then, views the subject of divorce pro-
cedure through the eyes of the lawyer as a social engineer. It
suggests a plan for modifying the system with a hope of ultimate
interprofessional cooperation. Along such lines a real advance
may be possible. It is helpful to distinguish between the two
aspects of the lawyer. As a skilled technician, he receives in
his office clients with domestic difficulties, attempts reconcili-
ations, and procures from the court decrees setting forth mutual
rights and duties. As a social engineer, he, like other pro-
fessional people, is interested in the quantity and quality of the
specialized service which his group furnishes to the client pub-
lic.' He wants to know whether all the human problems he is
able to solve are brought to him.' To this end he has borrowed
a phrase from the physicians and speaks of "preventive law."
He is also concerned that each human problem should be solved
as well as possible. Lack of machinery for adequate interpro-
fessional cooperation makes for overlapping in some matters and
interstitial gaps in others. This condition, characteristic of a
frontier stage, makes it doubtful whether the public is receiving
all or the best care it deserves. When the complete remedy
must combine resources from several professional fields, much
remains to be done.
5 The activity of the most recent professional group, the marriage coun-
sellor, Is Indicated by the existence of the National Conference on Family
Relations. For a collection of literature on the subject, see Mariage and
Family LiqIng, a publication of the National Conference on Family Relations.
'Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association, Opinion 82: "An attorney is obligated to advise his client as to
the best Interests of the client as seen by the attorney."
' "In any consideration of the legal profession, three separate standards
or, as I prefer to put It, levels of criticism and effort, should be distinguished:
"First, the level which accepts existing society and the present standards
of the profession, and seeks merely to enforce or to induce adherence to
thope standards.
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The lawyer as a technician is well acquainted with the good
and bad points of divorce procedure in his jurisdiction. As a
social engineer he may find it profitable to examine the records
of agencies such as domestic relations courts, juvenile courts,
and legal aid societies to secure a fair picture.' From this point
of departure we shall list several criticisms.
OBJECTIONS TO THE MEANS BY WHICH DIVORCES AmE SECURED
Attention will be limited to three questions: What should
be the goal of a divorce proceeding; what may be done in a pre-
liminary way to improve the quality and quantity of interpro-
fessional service in such cases; and is litigation necessarily the
most effective device for presenting the contentions of the par-
ties and producing a suitable decision? To the critic who com-
plains that such matters are imponderable, opinion, and not sus-
ceptible of statistical proof, it may be answered that we are
drawing ourselves up by our own boot straps. We must set up
and test many tentative standards before we are prepared to
recommend a permanent measuring rod. These are initial steps
to be undertaken with humility.
A. What Should Be the Goal of Divorce Proceedings?
The individualistic plaintiff in divorce proceedings may
have a variety of goals ranging perhaps from a bona fide desire
to obtain relief from an intolerable domestic situation to a spite-
ful wish to use the process to humiliate publicly the defendant.
The number of reported appellate cases in which the questions of
support or property settlement or custody of children occur sug-
gests that the real issues between the parties are in the material'
rather than the spiritual field. Still other plaintiffs are intent
"Second, the level which accepts existing society and its organization,
but seeks to make the profession conform the better to its functions and
purposes in that society.
"Third, the level which accepts neither existing society nor existing stan-
dards of the profession, and seeks to transform society and the profession as
a part of it into a new social order." Cheatham, What the Law Schools Can
Do to Raise the Standards of the Legal Profession (1933) 7 A.m. L. SCHOOL
REV. 716, 717.
, Records of The National Probation Association, The Family Welfare
Association of America, and The National Association of Legal Aid Organi-
zations will lead the inquirer to a fund of information.
9 "In practice, then, the controversial matters in divorce litigation are
not concerned with the termination of the marital status; they are concern-
ed with financial and property arrangements, and upon occasion with custo-
dy of minor children." MARSHALL AND MAY, THs DivoRcE COURT-OHO (1933)
23.
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upon the divorce decree as signalizing the right to marry some-
one else, or as a springboard to accumulate public sympathy.
The interprofessional inquirer must look further for a socially
desirable goal.
The goal of the general public is indicated by the legislature.
The statutes designating "grounds" or "causes" for divorce pre-
sent the issues to be determined by the courts. While one may
assume that the effect of this mass of legal rules is to relieve
the legally innocent spouse from an intolerable domestic situa-
tion caused by the legally guilty spouse, the real question is still
unanswered. What are tests by which to determine the "intol-
erable" condition? For the bona fide plaintiff tests are of com-
paratively minor importance. But if the "grounds" become in
the public mind merely pegs on which to hang manufactured evi-
dence, the judicial scrutiny required to prevent plaintiffs from
imposing upon the court may become a substantial burden." A
trial in which each spouse is trying to jockey the other into an
unfavorable position may lead to such an emphasis on techni-
calities as temporarily, at least, to obscure the real merits of the
case. Some awareness by the legislature of the dangers implicit
in such a situation is indicated by provisions for a decree nisi or
a definite limitation upon the freedom to remarry after a final
decree." The plaintiff who goes across a state line to achieve
what is not within his reach at home contributes to the com-
plexity of the present problem.
The lawyer as a social engineer may see another possible
goal. Some critics have adopted a hostile attitude toward cer-
tain aspects of professional functioning.'2 It would seem that
in an increasingly complex civilization professions inevitably
are set up on the basis of public confidence that they will provide
expert means of solving human problems. In this view of a case
a profession is valuable depending upon how well it handles hu-
man problems and how alert it is to increase the quantity and
quality of its service to the public. It would follow that the
goal of the law, or any other profession, in divorce procedure
is not the signing of a final decree-that is merely a means to
an end-but the solving of as many as possible of the human
102 VERNiEm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 92.
I 1Id. at 172.
"United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.(2d) 703 (1940);
RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS (1939); see also Raub, The Anti-Trust Pro-
secution Against the American Medical Association (1939) 6 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoD. 595.
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problems involved in the domestic catastrophe. Such a goal
does no violence to the wishes of a bona fide plaintiff. Neither
does it lessen the interest of the state in the preservation of the
family. Rather it is a challenge to lawyers and other pro-
fessional groups to do their best. It holds out a hope that a way
may be found to distinguish the complainant who is not proceed-
ing in good faith. Such a goal, by the very nature of its realis-
tic approach, forces upon our attention the next question.
B. What May Be Done in a Preliminary Way to Improve the
Quality and Quantity of Interprofessional Service
in Divorce Cases?
This question may be phrased simply, what human prob-
lems are we going to try to solve in the course of a divorce
case? The legislatures have declared that the issues should be
the doing or not doing of certain acts such as adultery, cruelty,
and desertion. Legal writers have recognized that these are
only a part of the problems involved." There is no value in at-
tempting here a complete catalogue, but three classifications
which will help us in our present inquiry deserve mention.
With respect to the time they arise, there are matters origina-
ting prior to the divorce proceedings, those which develop while
the case is being litigated, and those which come into being after
the divorce decree is signed. At present, divorce procedure
makes substantial provision for only a few of the problems fall-
ing within the first group. There are social, economic, medical,
and, of great importance, spiritual matters which merit recogni-
tion and consideration. But such items have to a considerable
extent been ignored in divorce procedure.
The relief afforded by the present legal process is limited.
The successful spouse may secure a decree, the judicial approval
of a property settlement, and the custody of children. Valuable
as these remedies are, they do not go far enough, nor can their
range and effectiveness be greatly increased as long as lawyers
alone are permitted to participate. By considering the court
proceeding as a hub around which the various professions may
circulate in the cooperative endeavor, it may be possible not
only to solve more human problems but to do a better piece of
work.
'3 JACOBS AND ANGELL, A RESEARCH IN FAMILY LAW (1930), lists a large
number of these problems.
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It is not contended that every human problem can, or even
should, be dealt with. But the critic is asked to consider the
significance of the process if the issues to be tried were similar
to the following:
Why are these particular spouses unable to live amicably
together as normal married people do?
Will the parties be sufficiently better off in any demon-
strable fashion after the divorce than they were before?
How will the process of granting a divorce affect the secur-
ity to which other members of the group may be morally en-
titled?
Will some other solution than a divorce decree be more
adequate to the particular problems?
Juvenile and domestic relations courts are constantly con-
cerned with questions which do not differ greatly from those
listed above, except that the consequences there are not as
serious as in divorce." The proposed change appears, therefore,
not so much a blind plunge into the unknown as an effort to re-
move a handicap from the divorce court so that it may do its
work more successfully than in the past. Neither should the
critic assume that undue or undesirable regimentation is in-
tended. The state has long announced its interest in marriage,
the family, and divorce. It is regarded as proper to deny cer-
tain persons the right to marry because of physical or mental
unfitness." The members of the select group, who are entitled
to marriage licenses, have entire freedom to function in family
groups so long as they are able to care for their own relation-
ships. When, however, the marriage bonds are so strained that
one spouse applies for a divorce, an abnormal situation is pre-
sented. The law is accustomed to making provision for ab-
normal situations or individuals in the criminal field," and the
process of rehabilitation is not usually regarded as an undue
regimentation.
If in like fashion the procedure of the divorce court were
designed to see to it that the parties emerged at least as well off
as they were before, the plan might have social desirability.
It is urged that responsibility for experimenting in this
field of domestic relations should be at the lawyer's door. He is
in a position to know the facts and perhaps to do something
,1 Seagle, Domestic Relations Courts (1931) 5 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 194 et
seq.
16 Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966 (1914).
, Sellin, Probation and Parole (1934) 12 ENCYc. Soc. SCiENcEs 435 et seq.
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about them. Failure to act may entail no unfavorable conse-
quences. On the other hand, in a dynamic period of the history
of our civilization like the present, the profession which is con-
tent to remain passive may well find the initiative passing into
the hands of others. Lost public leadership is hard to regain,
and the lay criticism of the bar today is such as to justify an
alertness on the part of agencies like public relations committees
of bar associations" with respect to any field of law which may
appear to lag. Tradition is not a complete answer to modern
demands for improved service.
C. Is Litigation in Divorce Cases Necessarily the Best Device
for Shaping the Contentions of the Parties and
Providing a Decision?
Litigation is a respected, traditional legal tool." It has
served many purposes. In American frontier history, it was
something of a community spectacle." To many a successful
suitor it offers an effective remedy for such of his problems as
lie within the field of law. Where he wishes to reimburse him-
self for damage inflicted by the defendant or where his purpose
is accomplished by restraining the person of the defendant
temporarily or permanently, litigation gives the successful plain-
tiff a fair chance. But in divorce, the benefits of litigation are
not as clear.
This may be because historically we have mistaken the na-
ture and goal of a divorce proceeding and have attempted to put
the square peg of the most intimate sort of human misery into
the round hole of a procedure designed to settle disputes between
persons dealing at arm's length. If the wife desires to put the
husband in jail because he is guilty of adultery, cruelty, or de-
sertion, litigation would raise the issues and provide a remedy
as effective as that available in any other criminal proceeding.
If the husband desires to sue his wife for damages for assault
" For example, The Report of the Special committee on Public Rela-
tions of the American Bar Association (1941) 66 A. B. A. REP. 337,338, states:
"Finally, the state and local bar associations believe it to be the obligation
of the American Bar Association to correct misrepresentations and expose
unfair criticisms which are carried on upon a broad or national scale."
182 POLLOCK AND M1AITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 558 et
seq.
'9 "Many of its [American procedure] features are more appropriate to
rural agricultural communities, where In intervals of work, the farmer, re-
mote from the distractions of city life, found his theatre in the courthouse
and looked to politics and litigation for amusement, than to modern urban
communities." POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw (1921) 124.
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and battery, slander, libel, acting outside the scope of her
agency, or for some other wrongful act (assuming that such an
action were legally possible),"0 litigation would provide as ef-
fective a procedure as is available against any other tortfeasor.
But argument has already been made in this article that the
wishes of the parties and the opinion of a majority of the gen-
eral public are of doubtful value as objects for divorce. If we
agree that the real purpose is to relieve a legally innocent spouse
from an intolerable domestic situation, or if we go further and
contend that the goal is to solve as many human problems as pos-
sible, the inadequacy of the present court routine is clearer.
The most obvious difficulty lies in the fact that marriage,
while sometimes spoken of as a contract, is distinguishable as a
matter of law from the ordinary commercial contract." There-
fore, a procedure designed to deal with a breach of contract is
not always adequate for the more complicated task of unraveling
the tangled threads of the marriage bonds and adjusting the re-
spective relationships so that each spouse may continue to live
a useful life. Marriage creates a status." We might well ex-
pect that the dissolution of a status would call for a different
procedure.
Another difficulty lies in the contentious character of liti-
gation. By the time a divorce case comes to court, there is
enough difference of opinion between the parties to satisfy
most litigious individuals. The plaintiff in order to succeed
must prove that the defendant has been guilty of one or more
10 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 268.
"1 MCCURDY, CASES oN DOMEsTIc RELATIONS (3d ed. 1939) 63 et seq.
22The following material suggests the background against which the
legal concept of marriage was developed. Stern, Women, Position in Society
(1935) 15 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 442, 444: "Canon Law institutionalized male
dominance, reflecting the Influence of the strongly patriarchal family law of
the Old Testament and of Germanic Law. The wife became completely sub-
ject to her husband's authority, deprived of legal rights and independent
existence. As marriage was held to be a sacrament, she could have no re-
course to divorce." Hankins, Divorce (1931) 5 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 177: "It
[divorce] Is designed primarily to relieve the hardships imposed in individual
cases by the customary marriage rules." "The western Christian church
made both marriage and divorce difficult because of its doctrine that sex Is
inherently sinful. Marriage was made a sacrament and under the influence
of St. Augustine became indissoluble. But the impossibility of forcing peo-
ple to live together In the intimacy of marriage compelled the church to
authorize separation from bed and board. Moreover, the numerous impedi-
ments to marriage enabled the church lawyers to find grounds for declaring
any marriage Invalid from the beginning provided plausible reasons whether
personal, political or pecuniary could be brought forward." Id. at 79. 3
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY Or ENGUSH LAw (1927) C. 4, lists as examples of status
In medieval law: the king, the Incorporate person, the villian, the infant, the
married woman.
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acts which are frowned upon by orthodox society. Even when
the alleged "grounds" are some unrevealing phrase such as "two-
year separation" or "mental cruelty," the inquirer may infer
that other disreputable behavior is frequently concealed behind
the label. It would seem that the inability of the parties to live
together in normal fashion should be sufficiently shocking with-
out making the black mark of a crime on the public record of the
defendant. But the irritating factors do not stop here. The
allegations in the divorce complaint may be unanswered while
the fight centers around how much the husband is to pay the
wife or who is to have custody of the children. It is, perhaps,
impossible of proof, but one may imagine that litigation has a
hand in barring at least some reconciliations.
Litigation, therefore, falls short of a perfect solution be-
cause marriage is a status, and the resulting dissolution of the
family is too complex a task. There is reason to inquire wheth-
er other solutions exist in our modern world. If they do, an
examination of them is justified. If they promise better results,
there is reason to experiment with them.
Many sincere persons feel that litigation should not be at-
tacked or criticised. Here, however, we are recognizing that it
has a definite place, but the inquiry is as to how far its effective-
ness extends. The public seems to have been asking itself the
same question. Studies of court records during the last ten
years in some sections of the country indicate a steady decline
in litigated cases.2' At the same time procedures such as con-
ciliation, arbitration, and mediation have found favor. For ex-
ample, the increasing interest in pre-trial procedure is signifi-
cant.' In criminal, juvenile, and domestic relations courts the
orthodox processes of litigation have been modified by the use
of procedures such as probation and parole and the introduction
of people from other professional fields-social service case
workers, psychiatrists, and physicians working cooperatively
toward the solution of more human problems." But during this
23 Garrison, The Problem of Over-crowding (1941) 16 TENN. L. RE.v. 658,
666.
2, On pre-trail procedure see Report of the Committee on Pre-trial Pro-
cedure (1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 534. As one example of other types of admin-
istrative proceeding, see Nathanson, The Emergency Price Control Act of
1942: Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review (1942) 9 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 60.
2" for one am wholly satisfied that some time within the next hun-
dred years there will be a general acceptance of the conviction that the court
should have less control over the process of correctional treatment." Bates,
The Next Hundred Years (1941) PROB. & PAROLE PRou. 75,82. "... the plan for
a treatment board merely sets up our belief that within the last hundred
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period of transition the most serious of the domestic problems,
divorce, is still shackled to a traditional procedure.
If we are able to achieve an objectively impersonal view-
point as social engineers, we may come to question whether the
present final decree is an appropriate point at which the courts
should cease to take an interest in the case. An analogy from
the medical field may creep into our thinking. A patient faced
with a serious operation is able to have the benefit of a whole
battery of medical experts from the general practitioner to the
specialists and the surgeon. After the operation, days or weeks
of treatment and convalescence are regarded as the ordinary
course of events. If the surgeon operated and then let the
patient walk out of the operating room to find his way home
and recover or die as fate decreed, public criticism would be
heard. A divorce trial for many clients causes as much social
and economic dislocation and distress as an operation, but with
the signing of a decree, nisi or final, the court has performed
its function. It is not the court which is to blame, but our-
selves, for allowing the unexamined system to continue year
after year. The use of probation officers, social case workers,
and other experts after the decree would help the parties to
regain a condition which might be described as "legally
healthy," or at least an approximation of normality.
In reviewing the objections to the means by which divorces
now are secured, it may be said that their goal is set by the gen-
eral public and fails to include many community resources avail-
able from other professional fields. Only a few human problems
are solved, while it is likely that others are created. Procedures
other than litigation are available, and there is reason to explore
some of the possibilities.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A REMEDY
If the proposed remedy is to meet the foregoing criticisms,
it should adopt an interprofessional goal in which the views of
the spouses, the public, and the interested professional groups
are all given recognition. It should be designed to solve more
human problems and create less new ones. It should be based
years we have discovered much that is new with reference to psychiatric
treatment, behaviorism and the etiology of crime and delinquency; and that
we are determined within the next hundred years to put our communitihs
In the position where these new discoveries can be applied more efficiently
and definitely in the correctional field." rd. at 83.
(V l. 
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on some procedure other than orthodox litigation. The inquirer
cannot hope that these suggestions constitute a final answer.
They do serve, however, to open up lines of speculation.
1. Divorce should be rather a conciliatory than a conten-
tious proceeding.
2. The parties in interest should include the spouses and
the members of the family.
3. The goal should be to work out whatever plan is best
for the family as a whole.
4. The divorce court should be supplied with interprofes-
sional personnel, tools, and sanctions to enable it to cope with
this most serious of domestic problems.
1. Conciliatory proceeding. A conciliatory proceeding is
to be preferred in our suggested solution because we are to deal
with both legal and nonlegal problems, and at the same time we
are to use both legal and extralegal professional resources.
Further, it is important that the clients should be kept as peace-
ful as possible throughout the proceeding so as not to create
new problems.
In such a proceeding we may develop a new set of issues.
Instead of quarreling over whether B's conduct does or does not
amount to cruelty according to law, we can ask the legislature
to declare that a divorce shall be granted when it appears to
the satisfaction of the court that, as a matter of fact, the mem-
bers of the family are no longer able to live together in normal
harmony. The court should determine this question in the light
of all information available through the various resources of
the community and interpreted by whatever professional experts
may be needed. Naturally, every reasonable effort should be
made for rehabilitation, and if it appears that part of the family
must be broken down, no more damage should be done than is
actually necessary.
There is no reason to ignore cruelty, or adultery, or deser-
tion, but the court should be interested in the reasons creating
the difficulty, just as a criminal court wants to know as much as
possible about the background of the accused before imposing
sentence. Perhaps a physician can deal effectually with the in-
clination toward adultery. A psychiatrist may discover the
cause of cruelty. Desertion may come about because of eco-
nomic pressure, and an employment agency may provide the
answer. Similar problems are thus dealt with in domestic rela-
tions and juvenile courts. The proposal here is merely to ex-
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tend the well-tried techniques to divorce cases. At present many
questions may arise which, for lack of information, cannot be
answered. Under the proposal every divorce would be justified
as a socially desirable act, and the ruling of the judge would be
buttressed by the considered opinions of experts. The form of
the proceeding would tend to hold the family situation in a static
condition while a study is made and all possible preventives are
applied.
2. The dissolution of the family. The controversy be-
tween husband and wife in the present procedure is thrust so
sharply into the foreground that we tend to think of the case
as involving a personal disagreement between them. Actually
the procedure inevitably involves the dissolution of a family
group. The court is breaking up a status." This complicates
the picture and gives added reason for inviting other profes-
sions to cooperate.
The object with which we are dealing may be described as
a "sick" or abnormal family. The goal, as in the medical field,
is its rehabilitation to a condition approximately normal. The
legally abnormal person has been recognized as deserving pecu-
liar care. Children, married women, aliens, and mentally un-
balanced persons are favored by special legislation, and provis-
ion is made for their entry into the class of legally responsible
persons. But these rules of law deal with rights and duties
between such individuals and others. The proposed plan would
be designed to improve or terminate relationships among mem-
bers of a family so that the group might continue with as little
damage as possible. Children, aged persons,, and family de-
pendents may be more seriously inconvenienced by a divorce than
the warring spouses. One may argue a moral right in every
member of a family to have that group continue until its further
existence is harmful. The proposal is to make this something
more than a moral right so that in a democracy the family may
20 The process of dissolution of the marital status in the Middle Ages was
a matter for the ecclesiastical courts with their peculiar procedures and
sanctions. "The ecclesiastical courts had, certainly from the twelfth cen-
tury, undisputed jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. Questions as to the
celebration of marriage, as to the capacity of the parties to marry, as to the
legitimacy of the issue, as to the dissolution of marriage, were decided by the
ecclesiastical courts administering the canon law." 1 HOLDSWORTH, ISTORY OF
ENLISH LAW (1927) 621. See also 2 BIsHOP, NEW COmmuNTARiEs ON THE LAW
or MARRIAGE, DIVORCIc, AND SEPARATION (1891) 447 et seq.
3 HOLDSWoRTH, A HisToRY OF ENoLsH LAW (3d ed. rewritten 1923) 489,
496, mentions a somewhat analogous procedure with respect to the dissolu-
tion of an incorporate person.
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continue to perform .functions which under other forms of politi-
cal control are prerogatives of the State."
As evidence of this change it might be well to change the
captions of divorce cases so that they will no longer read
" .....................................v . . . .   " but rather "In re the dis-
solution of the ............. . Family."
3. The welfare of the family. In the juvenile court the
slogan, "what is best for the child," is well recognized as a guid-
ing principle for the individualized treatment of cases and the
solution of problems. By analogy the divorce court might well
measure the effectiveness of its work in terms of the ultimate
welfare of the family. To relieve the distress of the complaining
spouses would then be not an end in itself but a step toward
making the family, or what is properly left of it, function norm-
ally. In some instances, family breakdown could be entirely
avoided. In others, comparable to limited divorce, temporary
"treatment" under expert supervision might result in eventual
reconciliation. If a divorce were granted, it would be because
the remainder of the family could function better with one
member permanently excluded than in any other way.
4. The process of family dissolution. Legal analogies to
family dissolution may be found in the settlement of a bank-
rupt's estate and the untangling of the affairs of a partnership
or a corporation. The mention of such proceedings suggests a
series of steps: the determination of the need for dissolution,
the notice to all interested parties, the taking over of assets to
be applied in a particular manner, the plan for distribution of
assets, and the final accounting. The suggested plan in the do-
mestic field would follow a similar set of steps.
The conciliatory proceeding would begin upon application
to the divorce court. Some question might be raised as to who
should be eligible to make such an application. In juvenile and
domestic relations courts considerable latitude is allowed. To
The nature of the process of excommunication Is described in Hagetine,
Excommunication (1931) 5 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCE S 671, In which excommuni-
catio major, excommunicatio minor, interdictum, and &uspensio were men-
tioned as medicinal punishments in contrast with poenae indicativae. See
also Brown, The Canon Law of Marriage (1939) 26 VA. L. REv. 70.
- 27 For a reference to the German concept of marriage as a "service to the
folk community," see Mankiewicz, The German View of Alimony Before and
Under National Socialism (Fuller trans.) (1939) 6 LAw & CoNxmP. PRoB. 301.
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allow any member of the family to make the request might raise
criticism. To recognize the complaints of neighbors, friends,
and others would be even more objectionable.
The application would be in the name of "The ...........................
Family." Whether it should be for a specific object, like di-
vorce, or for general equitable relief might require further con-
sideration. The latter would give the court more freedom in
handling such problems as come to light with a view to serving
the ultimate welfare of the family.
The application itself need not be complicated in form, but
it should contain such information and be couched in such
language as would permit a thorough interprofessional investi-
gation of the problems. An analogy might be the assembling
of assets and filing of claims by parties in the settlement of a
bankrupt's estate.
Jurisdiction over the spouses would be acquired as at
present. Just which other members of the family should be
treated as parties in interest would depend upon the circum-
stances of the particular case, but notice should be given to all
whose rights might appear to be affected-either through per-
sonal service or publication. It is unlikely that the situation
would be appreciably more complicated than it is at present.
As the case proceeded others might be perlitted to intervene.
The court would then direct a thoroughgoing interprofes-
sional examination of the family relationships with recommen-
dations from the experts as to what the problems were and what
could and should be done about them.
Hearings might be held to satisfy the constitutional promise
to each person of a day in court. But the method employed
need not be litigation. The interest of the legal profession in
pre-trial procedure has been noted, A court with authority to
make rules covering the situation should be able to employ this
alternative device with good results. The eventual finding of
facts by the court should be subject to review on appeal for
those who insist on their rights.
Instead of the present decree nisi a plan would be made
either for rehabilitation or dissolution. It would be similar in
some respects to a composition agreement of creditors or a pro-
posal of a committee of stockholders in a liquidation process.
The future of the family would be worked out with a view to
preserving as much as may be retained. The plan might re-
quire modification. It might fail of its purpose, but it would be
an individualized program for a particular family at a particu-
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lar time and in the presence of a particular set of problems,
rather than a general rule laid down by the legislature for all
members of a more or less arbitrarily selected class. The extent
of control exercised by the court would depend in large measure
on the facts of the individual case, and an appeal from the court
order promulgating this plan would be permitted.
The carrying out of the plan under supervision of the
members of the family or of the court officers and the filing of
a final report would bring the case to the point where a final
decree might be entered.
To put into effect such a procedure as has been outlined
above would require substantial statutory changes as well as
new habits of cooperation among the professions. The old law
of divorce would have to be repealed and a new law, em-
bodying the dissolution concept, substituted for it. This new
law would work a substantive change by setting up issues
which would go to the heart of the problem. It would work a
procedural change by giving the court great freedom in the
rule-making power so that the hearings might be individualized
and the knowledge of experts utilized. It would make avail-
able'the sanctions of parole and probation, so long familiar and
effective in juvenile and domestic relations courts. Outside the
courtrooms it would be necessary that the need for closer
interprofessional cooperation be recognized so that confidence
in professional leadership may be retained. The creation in
each community of a council of professional workers similar
to existing councils of social agencies but wider in scope to plan
for better service to the public might be justified. It is to be
noted that though the collection of a suitable staff of profes-
sional and clerical workers might involve some additional
expense, if the results were beneficial, the cost would be a minor
item.
CONCLUSION
The proposal to make divorce a conciliatory matter of fam-
ily dissolution rather than of contentious litigation between the
spouses is a change in legal concept. It is not suggested that
the plan is a perfect solution but merely that it promises
enough advantages over the present system to warrant a fair
trial. It is not designed to meet such controversial questions as
whether divorce should be made easier or harder. It deals
rather with method. It proposes to change the issues and thus
direct attention to more realistic and socially justifiable ends.
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The position of the lawyer under the proposal will be much the
same as it is now. He and the other professional workers
interested in the problem will continue their efforts to untangle
the lives of the members of "ailing" families and rehabilitate
them or remedy what can be cured. The court has need for in-
creased powers and somewhat broadened duties. The public
will benefit from more adequate interprofessional service.
Progress in dealing with domestic troubles has been re-
tarded largely because the thinking of the general public on the
subject is in confusion. One of the privileges of the professional
groups which are interested in divorce and its attendant prob-
lems would seem to be to provide leadership in finding better
solutions. Social pioneering is somewhat hazardous for the
inquirer, but it is challenging and for that reason alone should
attract the professional groups. The lawyer as a social engineer
will necessarily be one member of any competent exploring
party. Particularly is his guidance needed where it is proposed
to reexamine the concepts upon which some of our legal institu-
tions are based. There is no more important task in a democracy
than keeping the tools of the law continually adjusted to accom-
plish effectively their share of the task of solving human prob-
lems. There are few human problems of more general interest
than those which relate to the conditions under which a man
lives with the other members of his family.
II. MODERN DIVORCE LAW-THE COMPROMISE
SOLUTION
Robert Neunert
A LEGAL institution can be a compromise or a hotchpot. It
is a compromise if its purpose is to adjust conflicting in-
terests upon an evaluation of their merits and to reconcile them
as much as that is possible under the circumstances. It is a
hotchpot if it is a combination of rules without a clear under-
standing of the embodied principles of policy or without a view
of an ultimate goal. Which type of legal institution is our
divorce law? Most persons will answer that it is a compromise
t LL.D., 1922, University of Munich. Professor, German University of
Prague, 1927-39. Lecturer in Law, Yale University, since 1939. Author of
articles In various European journals and Respondeat Superior in the Light
of Comparative Law (1941) 4 LA. L. REV. 1; Value Judgments and Experience
in Legal Philosophy (1942) 52 ETHIcS 481; Policy Considerations in the Con-
flict of Laws (1942) 20 CAN. B. REv. 479; Criminal War and Criminal Warfare
(1942) 2 NEw Eunopn 364.
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between the idea that marriage is indissoluble and the principle
of freedom of divorce. This view is supposed to be the reason
why divorce is allowed only upon a limited number of specific
grounds. There is little doubt that the legislatures which en-
acted the divorce laws believed that they were making this sort
of a compromise, but there is much doubt whether they achieved
their purpose and whether the result reached is a compromise
in the sense above mentioned.
If the purpose of divorce statutes is to effect a compromise,
they have achieved this purpose only to a very limited extent.
Such laws do not prevent a couple who have agreed upon a di-
vorce from securing it. This is due to the fact that rules which
have been developed in order to make divorce by agreement
impossible-that is, the ruleson collusion, on corroboration of
evidence, and even the rules on the participation of a public
official, a proctor, or a similar officer'-have proved to be in-
effective in divorce suits. The use of an officer no doubt has
more effect than the others, but even an officer is rarely capable
of piercing the veil of a case if it is cleverly presented to the
court.
Less known is the psychological effect of the divorce laws.
The spouse who wants a divorce is able to secure it. By alter-
nating tortures and promises, one spouse softens the other up
until the other spouse finally is forced to agree to a divorce.
Whether this strategy succeeds or not is only a matter of tenac-
ity. Strangely enough, this result is in keeping with the law.
In these cases there is almost always a ground for divorce in the
sense of the law, such as adultery or cruelty. The difficulty is
that the spouse who was not willing to avail himself of the reme-
dies of the law has been unduly forced to make use of them.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no way of formulating a legal
rule which would prevent this misuse. Sociological and psycho-
logical forces have proved to be stronger than the will of the
legislator. While the legislator allows divorce only if certain
specific grounds are given, in fact divorce is granted if both
parties or even one alone wants it with sufficient energy and if
they are advised by capable but dishonest counsel.
HYBRID CHARACTER OF THE DIVORCE GROUNDS
The main reason for this state of affairs is the hybrid
character of the statutory grounds for divorce which are the
'2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 92.
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resultant of very different ideas and policies. The supposition
that divorce is allowed only for a limited number of specific
grounds so as to effect a compromise is fallacious because the
coincidence of history played much too large a part in its compo-
sition. The main characteristics of our modern divorce system,
i.e., the system which allows absolute divorce if certain specific
grounds which are enumerated in a statute are proven, were
created by Luther, Calvin, and the later reformers. These re-
formers did not create their marriage laws and principles out
of nothing. They used many of the traditional concepts of the
canon law. This was only proper from their point of view
because they wanted to purify the Church from the abuses.
By the time of the Reformation, canon law had developed
the principle that a limited divorce could be granted upon two
specific grounds, adultery and cruelty. The innovation intro-
duced by the reform was that these grounds were now regarded
as grounds for absolute divorce, whereas canon law had treated
them as grounds for perpetual or temporary separation only,
and that out of the Pauline privilege (I Corinthians III, 12-15)
the divorce ground of desertion was developed. Curiously
enough, the same procedure was repeated in the nineteenth cen-
tury when English and American judges applied the doctrines
which Lord Stowell' had expressed for separation a mensa et
thoro to cases of absolute divorce.
The transfer made by both the reformers and the judges
should not have been made unless prior thereto they had in-
quired whether the purpose and the function of the rules to be
transferred would be consonant with the proposed principles of
policy. This raises the whole question as to the sensibility of
transferring rules developed for a system of limited divorce into
a system of absolute divorce. The suspicion arises that the
unsatisfactory state of the divorce law is partly caused by the
application of rules which originally were framed for a different
purpose. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that an
analysis of the most important grounds for divorce shows that
the rules of canon law on the grounds for separation have been
blended with ideas of very different origin and purpose. The
resulting mixture hardly represents the fruit of mature delibera-
tion or of sound compromise.
The most important ground for divorce is adultery which
Lord Stowell often cites the classic authors of canon law, especially
Sanchez.
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is found in all legal systems which allow divorce at all. If
adultery is committed, divorce is granted quite independently of
the consequences upon the human relations between the spouses.
The innocent spouse has an absolute right to get the divorce.'
When adultery is the only ground for divorce, it is difficult to
understand why only this violation of the marital duties should
be penalized in this way.
The other important ground for obtaining a divorce is that
of cruelty. Canon law realized that the duty to lead a common
life with the other spouse can come into conflict with the right
and the duty to conserve one's own bodily and spiritual existence
and health. It, therefore, subordinated the former duty to the
latter.' This is the origin of the rule, which we still find in so
many statutes, that cruelty is a ground for divorce only if it
endangers the life of the other spouse. In a system of limited
divorce this adjustment of conflicting interests seems to be
reasonable, especially if cruelty is given as broad a definition as
by some writers on canon law.' But whether cruelty can be
applied in a system of absolute divorce depends on a different
consideration. In this system the question to be asked is not
when should a spouse be allowed to leave the other spouse, but
when should both parties be permitted to separate and to look
for a new companion. This question cannot be answered by
simply stating that every spouse has the right not to be en-
dangered or harassed by the other. Many other interests must
be taken into account, especially the interest which supposedly
the state has in upholding marriages. Since cruelty is only a
symptom of marriage discord, the real problem which must be
solved is under what conditions should spouses who cannot get
along together be allowed to divorce. Most jurisdictions have
greatly expanded the old notion of cruelty because many more
The force of this tradition is so strong that the Germans, too, under
National Socialism followed it. See GRoSSDEUTSCHES EHEGESETZ (July 6, 1938)
§ 47.
4This idea has been expressed with particular clarity by SANCHEZ, DE
SANCTO MATRIMONU SACRAMENTO (1550-1610) Lib. X, Disp. 17, No. 5. The start-
ing point is a decretal of Alexander III. DE RE sTITUTIoNE SPOLIATORUM 2, 13.
See DAuvnLER, LE MARIACE DANS LE DROIT CLASSIQUE DE L'EGLISE (1933) 350;
ESMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN DROrT CANONIQUE (2d ed. 1935) 2, 110, where it Is
shown that the development was very slow.
'SANCHEZ, Op. cit. .=apra note 4, at Lib. X, Disp. 18, No. 3: "Integrum est
conjugi divertere ob alterius saevitiam. tantum, ut absque gravis damni
periculo non possit cuam illo habitare." Id. at No. 11: "Hine deducitur,
justum huius divortii rationem saevitiae causam ess, molestam cohabita-
tionem, discordias et jurgia gravia frequentia inter conjuges."
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circumstances had to be considered.' The principle which
had guided the canon law interpretation of cruelty has lost
much of its force, but a new policy has not yet been formulated.
ItHis widely believed that divorce is the sanction of a viola-
tion of the marital duties. The innocent spouse is no longer
bound by the promises made when contracting marriage if the
other spouse has himself broken his promises. Under this
principle two important limitations developed: A violation of the
marital duties justifies a divorce only if (1) the violation is com-
mitted with fault,' and (2) the plaintiff is not guilty of an
offense constituting a ground for divorce. Under the first limi-
tation a single case of adultery is a ground for divorce if
committed intentionally, but an uninterrupted series of adul-
terous acts by a nymphomaniac wife is not.' Similarly, cruelty
if committed by an irresponsible person does not justify a di-
vorce,' although it is evident that the innocent spouse needs
quite as much protection from an irresponsible partner as from
a.responsible one.
The second limitation refers to the doctrine of recrimina-
tion.'" The history of this doctrine is another instance of an
inconsiderate transfer of a rule from one setting into another
which entails irrational and unjust results." Roman law had
allowed a compensatio criminum in two situations: (1) The
0 Dickason v. Dickason, 40 Ariz. 377, 12 P.(2d) 280 (1932); Blazek v. Blazek
216 Iowa 775, 249 N. W. 199 (1933); Tscbida v. Tschida, 170 Minn. 335, 212 N.
W. 196 (1927); Chippenfield v. Chippenfield, 121 Neb. 204, 236 N. W. 440
(1931); Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917); Kingsley, Cruelty
as a Ground for Divorce in Iowa (1929) 14 IowA L. REv. 266, 275, 282; Moran,
Divorce for Incompatibility of Temperament (1941) 9 DUKE B. A. J. 49, 52.
1 The classic canon law denied divorce for adultery in single instances
where the wife was faultless, e.g., if she had been raped. DAUVILLIER, op. Cit.
supra note 4, at 345; ESMEIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 108. If the defendant
is at fault, the later canon-law doctrine allows divorce for adultery only.
See Liaoio, THEOLOGIA MOALS (1900) 700.
' Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851).
0 Tiffany v. Tiffany, 84 Iowa 122, 50 N. W. 554 (1891); Wertz v. Wertz, 43
Iowa 534 (1876). This is now the English rule too. Astle v. Astle, 3 All
Eng. Rep. 967 (1939); Kellock v. Kellock, 3 All Eng. Rep. 972 (1939). Never-
theless the divorce was granted in both cases upon a narrow interpretation
of the notion of fault. Lord Stowell seems to have taken the view of the
canon law. Kirkman v. Kirkman, 1 Hag. Con. 409, 161 Eng. Rep. 598 (1807).
0 There are many ways of explaining this doctrine. See JACOBS, CASES
ON DomEsTic RELrzoNs (2d ed. 1934) 461. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DomEsTic
RELATIONS (1931) 306, explains that the doctrine "has its foundation in the
principle that one who asks relief must come into court with clean hands."
To the same effect is KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DivoRcs (2d ed. 1923) 301.
" Note, Divorce-Recriminatoin as a Defense (1930) 29 McH. L. REV. 232,
gives a good survey but Is Incorrect as to its statement on Roman law.
[Vol. 28
1943] PROPOSED NEV TECHNIQUES IN THE LAW OF DIVORCE 277
husband could not obtain his wife's conviction for adultery"
if he himself had violated the marital duties," and neither party
could invoke the benefits granted to the innocent spouse by
Augustus' statute on adultery if both had been at fault."' How-
ever, it seems that in such a situation the husband could be
punished. (2) Whereas generally in the case of divorce the
husband was obliged to return the dos" to the wife, he could re-
tain a part of it if the wife had violated her marital duties
(retentio propter mores). But this right was denied if he him-
self was also guilty of a breach of the marital duties.
These rules were perfectly sensible as originally used, but
they were transferred into the wholly different field of canon
divorce law. It is possible that the Bible influenced this recep-
tion of the Roman law rule into the canon law, but the words
used by Pope Innocent III in his decretal of 1208'0 are so similar
to those used by Papinian that the decisive influence of the
Roman rule upon the canon-law rule can hardly be questioned.
Still more surprising is Lord Stowell's repetition of the view of
the Pope. He again founded the doctrine of recrimination upon
the same Roman texts." Since the unjust results of the doc-
trine of recrimination are generally recognized, it is hoped that
an understanding of its historical origin will help to abolish it.
INFLUENCE OF LEGAL THEORIES ON DIVORCE GROUNDS
One of the reasons of the unsatisfactory state of the law is
the superficial application of contract law to the divorce situa-
1"So-called judicium de moribus, abolished by Justinian, C.5.17.11.2;
C.5.13.1.5. This accounts for our scant knowledge of the relations between
the judicium de moribus and the retentio propter mores.
"Justinian, D.48.5.14.5. "Upianus Z7bro secundo de adulteres. Judex
adulterii ante oculos habere debet et inquirere, an maritus pudice Vivens
muleri quoque bonos mores colendi auctor fuerit; periniquum enm videtur
esse, ut pudicitiam vir ab uxcore eseigat quam ipse non exhibeat; quae res
potest et virum damnare, non rem ob compensahionem mutul criminis inter
utrosque communicare."
4Id. at D.24.3.39. "Papinianus Zibro undecimo quaestionum: id ita
accipi debet, ut ea lege quara ambo contempserunt neuter Vindicetur: Paria
enim delicta mutua pensatione dissolvuntur."
"The translation "dower" is misleading: "Dos" is a gift from the wife
or from one of her friends or relatives to the husband.
" Qum matrimon~i jus in 'troque laesum consistat, et paria delicta,
mutua compensatione tollantur" The principle itself is already contained
in a decretal of Alexander III (1159-1181). Another source Is AuGuTJiN, Dn
SERMONS DomIN IN MONTE, Lib. I, cap. 16, No. 47.
" Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. 747 (1819); Forster
v. Forster, 1 I-Iag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504 (1740). But Lord Stowell's
remarks, id. at 147, 161 Eng. Rep. at 506, show that he knew that the prin-
ciple of recrimination could not be applied to divorce In Roman law.
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tion. The often repeated slogan that marriage is a status and
not a contract, though worthless because of its generality, at
least has had the merit of warning against rash analogies. The
analogy is not permissible because the effect of a divorce differs
from the effect of a recission of a contract. In the case of a
breach of contract the injured party is excused from his own
performance and gets damages, so that he keeps the benefits of
the contract and in that sense the breaching party is punished.
But the spouse who obtains a divorce loses most of the benefits
of the marriage even though the decree grants alimony. On the
other hand, the divorce is very often regarded as a benefit by
the guilty party." That the innocent party is not compelled to
seek a divorce is true, but it is equally true that he never does
get a real indemnification for the breach of the marital duty of
the other party. In fact he only chooses the lesser evil or seizes
a welcome opportunity to rid himself of a tie which has become
burdensome. This indicates that divorce is not an adequate
sanction of the marital duties.
Another idea which influences our divorce laws is the
principle of frustration. Divorce is granted if the marriage
cannot achieve its purpose." But what is the purpose of mar-
riage? If it is the procreation of children, divorce because of
impotency must be allowed, as it is in fact in many jurisdictions.
If it is a happy and harmonious life, incompatibility of temper
must be recognized as a ground for divorce as was done in some
of the German Codes of the eighteenth century, e.g., in the
Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht." Insanity, too, can be justi-
fied as a ground for divorce only by this consideration.
Tracing our divorce grounds back to these lines of reason-
ing does not mean that each ground is and can be interpreted
only upon the principles underlying its origin. On the contrary,
arguments which are appropriate for one group of divorce
grounds have been applied to other groups. Canon-law doc-
trines are often applied to grounds of divorce which the canon
law did not recognize because they were believed to be contrary
to the spirit of the canon law. For example, recrimination is
13 Separatio a mensa et thoro can be regarded as a punishment with more
justification especially if the defendant has to pay alimony.
"0 One of the first who used this argument seems to be MnLToN, THE
DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE op DivocE, bk. I, c. 2.
20 § 718a.
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allowed as a defense in a divorce suit based on cruelty."1  More-
over the breach of contract doctrine is being constantly mixed
with the doctrine of frustration. Even the German marriage
law of July 6, 1938, under National Socialism continues this
tradition. It allows divorce for disorganization of the marriage
(Ehezer'rittung) only if it is caused by the defendant and if the
claimant has not himself contributed to it by his own fault."
PRACTICAL FUNCTIONING OF THE DIvoRCE SYSTEM
The cumulation and mixture of divorce grounds which are
derived from independent, if not contradictory, sets of ideas
accounts for much of the uncertainty of our divorce law. But
it is not sufficient to condemn the system upon this ground
alone. Much more serious are the objections which can be
raised upon an analysis of the practical functioning of the sys-
tem. As to that two facts are known:
First, the number of divorces is not dependent upon the
number and the definition of the divorce grounds."3 This state-
ment must be qualified however. If a jurisdiction recognizes
only one or two narrowly defined divorce grounds-the best
example is New York with adultery as the only ground-the
number of divorces granted every year is much smaller than in
those jurisdictions which adhere to the traditional scheme of
divorce grounds. But if a system of various divorce grounds
is adopted, it does not make much difference how they are de-
fined; the legislator thereby loses control of the divorce situa-
tion.' This leads to the other point which, too, is generally
accepted.
21 See the list in 2 VERNIER, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 85. Canon law did
not deny divorce in this situation upon the consideration that even a guilty
spouse is allowed to protect his life. See SANCHEZ, Op. cit. supra note 4, at
Lib. X, Disp. 18, No. 5.
22 GROSSDEUTSCHES EHEGESETZ (July 6, 1938) § 49: "A spouse can ask for
a divorce if through other grave violation of the marital duties or through
dishonest or immoral conduct the other spouse has guiltily caused so deep a
disorganization of the marriage that a restitution of a common life corre-
sponding to the essence of marriage cannot be expected. Who himself has
committed a violation cannot demand a divorce, if according to the kind of
violation, especially because of the connection between the violation of the
other spouse and his own fault, the claim for a divorce Is morally not justi-
fied under a correct evaluation of the essence of marriage.
2' CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS or AMERICAN DIVoRcE (1932) 91, 92; LICH-
TENBERGER, DIVORCE A STUDY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION (1909) 5; WILcox, THE DIvoRcE
PROBLEM, A STUDY IN STATISTICS (1891) 61.
"MowRER, FAMILY DISORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1939) 274.
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Second, the ground alleged in the complaint is often not the
real ground for which divorce is sought."  It is picked out for
reasons of procedural tactics. Assuming that "family disor-
ganization" in the sociological sense can be defined with suffi-
cient exactitude and that its factual realization can be ascer-
tained,"8 in addition there must always be the decision of one or
both parties to take recourse to divorce as the ultimate means
provided by law. This decision is dependent on materialistic
and moral considerations which have not much to do with the
grounds of divorce."? The law influences this opinion through
the provisions on alimony, and through the fact that divorce is
granted in a more or less easy way. It is evident that many
married couples would adjust themselves more readily if they
did not look at divorce as the easiest way of settling their prob-
lems. While divorce is a symptom of family disorganization
and one of its causes, it is also used as a tool to solve the prob-
lems. Thus it would be quite incorrect to say that divorce is
merely the result of the family disorganization.
FUNCTION AND REGULATION OF MARRIAGE
Social realities set limits to the activity of the legislator,
limits which are very narrow in the field of divorce law. Yet
to be aware of these limits is not enough. Human activity as
far as it is free must be directed toward a definite goal. No di-
vorce statute can be drafted or even interpreted without a con-
cept of the function of marriage and of the role which the state
should play in its regulation. Strange as it may sound, our
marriage and divorce laws are not based upon a decision of the
basic issues which are here involved.
25 CAHEN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 39; LEITENBERGER, DIVOizCE (1931) 121;
MOrtAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 50; Mowrer, The Variance Between Legal and
Natural Causes for Divorce (March 1924) J. OF SOCIAL FORCES 388.
28 This seems to me doubtful. See MoWRER, op. cit supra note 24, at 142.
MOWRER, PERSONALITy, ADJUSTMENT AND FAMILY DISCORD (1935) 49: "Adjust-
ment Is after all, a very relative term."
1 This is well illustrated by three Iowa cases which deal with a divorce
sought by very old persons. In Yetley v. Yetley, 196 Iowa 314, 194 N. W.
88 (1923), a man 81 years old wanted to divorce a 64 year old wife. The
motive apparently was the desire to deprive the wife of her right to take a'
part of his estate after his death and to give the whole estate to the children
of the first marriage. This motive was also probably influential in the
case of Graham v. Graham, 227 Iowa 223, 288 N. W. 78 (1939), though the
wife seemed to be guilty of actual cruelty (here the husband was 84 years
old, the wife, 44). The motive of the 66 year old wife who after a common
life of 39 years sought a divorce from her 79 year old husband in Walker v.
Walker, 205 Iowa 395, 217 N. W. 883 (1928), is not clear, but it Is evident
that In none of these cases was the dissolution of the marriage tie what the
plaintiff really wanted.
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If marriage life were merely a biological fact, the state
would not need to interfere with marriage. The play of the
forces of nature would determine the conduct of men in this
respect. But human reason has interfered with the course of
nature here as well as with respect to other primary facts of
life, e.g., nutrition as well as marriage has become the object of
conscious social action and moral evaluation. There is no way
back to the purely biological status of family life; therefore, a
decision on the function of marriage in society and in its moral
sense must be made. Then only can we know how far the
organs of the state should interfere through the means which
are their proper domain.
From an economic point of view, marriage as it exists to-
day is a device for the distribution of income and for the care
of persons who need to be supported. This is the economic func-
tion of the duties of supporting the other spouse and the children
and connects marriage with the general economic system.
Marxism clearly realized this connection; it saw that complete
freedom of marriage and divorce cannot be obtained unless both
spouses have equal opportunity to earn a living and a public
institution takes care of the children. It is assumed, of course,
that the state is responsible for the economic welfare of its citi-
zens. Ancient Rome acknowledged this duty only to a very
limited extent, and this is one of the reasons why Roman law al-
lowed free divorce without regard for the economic consequences
and without imposing a duty to pay alimony. But the modern
state has assumed the duty of supporting its citizens and even
its inhabitants and from this it follows that no regulation of
divorce law is possible without taking into account the ways in
which the population earns its livelihood.
If we assumed that these economic purposes were the only
ones which the state should pursue in its regulation of divorce,
this conclusion would follow: Divorce can be granted only
if a wife has as good a chance to earn a living as a man,
or if her support is otherwise assured. Soviet Russia pretends
to have achieved this social ideal and consequently allows free
divorce without imposing alimony. However, they allow one
exception: The duty to support the other spouse who is in-
capable of work continues for one year after the divorce. This
exception can be justified by the consideration that otherwise
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many spouses would try to evade their duty of support by a
divorce."
In our social and economic system a divorced wife, espec-
ially if she has attained an old age, has not much chance of
finding a remuneratory position. The medicine applied by our
divorce law is alimony,2 ' but its curing effect is small. Further-
more, many jurisdictions now grant alimony even to a guilty
wife."°  They recognize in this way the economic realities " but
at the price of a violation of our sense of justice. For it is al
imposition to force a man to support his adulterous wife after
the divorce. But the most serious objection is that our alimony
system ignores a fundamental economic reality, namely, that
very few men earn enough to support two wives. What sense
does it make to allow a man to remarry if he cannot feed his
second wife without impairing the support of the first wife?
This sort of financial bigamy is a luxury which the majority of
the population can ill afford. It seems that the people at large
have a better understanding of the situation than the legislator.
Alimony is asked for in a surprisingly small number of cases."
Under a purely economic point of view the right approach seems
to be not to make alimony dependent upon divorce, but divorce
upon alimony, i.e., to grant an absolute divorce only if the eco-
nomic situation of the spouse allows it."8
11 Even in a socialistic state the property relations of husband and wife
must be regulated in divorce cases. This gives rise to rather complicated
problems. See, e.g., V. S., Remarles on the Application of the Code of Laws
on Marriage, Family, and Guardianship in the Village (1929) 4 SOVYETSKAYA
YusTSIA 85.
1° As it Is practiced In American courts, alimony has a double function:
(1) to provide for the support of the spouse and (2) to divide property
which has been accumulated by the common efforts of both spouses. It is
Interesting to observe that in the latter respect community property ideas
appear In common-law jurisdictions. It might be asked whether the two
functions of the alimony device should not be treated differently.
0 Neville v. Neville, 220 Ala. 57, 124 So. 107 (1929); Boylan v. Boylan,
349 fli. 471, 182 N. E. 614 (1932); Blain v. Blain, 200 Iowa 910, 205 N. W. 785
(1925); Stiles v. Stiles, 224 Ky. 526, 6 S. W.(2d) 679 (1928); Morovec v.
Morovec, 123 Neb. 830, 244 N. W. 639 (1932); see Cairns v. Lewis, 169 Minn.
156, 161, 210 N. W. 885, 887 (1926). Contra: Baker v. Baker, 94 Fla. 1001,
114 So. 661 (1927); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 136 Kan. 69, 12 P.(2d) 804 (1932).
All but the Nebraska decisions are the result of statute.
1 In Dragish v. Dragish, 241 Mich: 563, 217 N. W. 769 (1928), alimony
was granted to the guilty wife as she had helped accumulate the property.
However, the statement In the text is meant to refer primarily to the eco-
nomic inability of the wife to make a living, especially if she has the care
and burden of children or is aged.
82 CAHEN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 61.
88 It Is Interesting to observe that In Walker v. Walker, 205 Iowa 395,
217 N. W. 883 (1928), one of the reasons why the court refused to grant a
divorce to two old people was that such a decree would necessitate the
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Analogous arguments can be used when the question is
asked how far the interests of the children should influence the
possibility of a divorce of their parents. As long as the par-
ents have the duty to support their children, the most natural
and economical way of doing it is to rear them in the common
home. Of course the common home of the parents can be worse
than no home, but that is not usually the case. The law should
provide for these situations and should give the judge the dis-
cretion to deny the divorce if it is to the interest of the children.
That divorce of parties with children should be treated differ-
ently from the dissolution of a childless marriage should be
clear, but generally the legislatures have refused to recognize
this. A California statute which prescribes an obligatory con-
ciliation proceeding before a suit for divorce of a marriage with
children can be tried" is a step in this direction."5
The conclusions which follow from the significance of the
marriage institution in the economic system are easily seen.
But marriage is more than a part of the economic order. It is
also based on the nature of man as a biological and a moral
being; hence it is subject to moral principles. On this point,
authors of so different views as G. K. Chesterton," Bertrand
Russell," Herman Keyserling,1 and Walter Lippmann" agree.
It is denied by some sociologists, at least implicitly." They
inquire into the success of marriages and rate them according
to the amount of personal happiness which the spouses find in
their marriages.'1 Such an inquiry is of course a legitimate
division of their common property, leaving both of them without home or
friends.
' CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 1771.
"Indiana makes remarriage dependent upon the capacity to support the
children of former marriages. Ind. Laws 1941, c. 31, § 2.
"' CHESTERTON, THE SUPERSTITION OF DIVORCE (1920).
31 RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS (1929).
2S KEYSERUNG, THE Boox OF MARRIAGE (1926).
19 LIPPMAN, A PREFACE TO MORALS (1929) 284.
"0 Bernard, An Instrument for the Measurement of Success in Marriage
(May 1933) PUB. Am. Socio. Soc. 94, 95. Here the author says: "The assump-
tion is made, then, that in our culture a marriage which builds and stabilizes
and integrates the personalities of its members is successful and one that
disintegrates or represses their personalities or causes conflicts In them Is
unsuccessful. The degree of satisfaction which each spouse feels is taken
as an index of the satisfaction his or her personality is receiving from the
marriage." This attempt to connect hedonism with the moral idea of a
culture of personality seems to me unsuccessful. See, however, TERMAN,
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MARITAL HAPPINESS (1938) 2, who correctly says
that an inquiry into marital happiness does not commit the author to a
philosophy.
"1The difficulties of a definition of "happiness" are discussed by
TEnmAN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 3; BURGESS AND COTTRELL, PREDICTING SUCCESS
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scientific enterprise and furnishes valuable information, but it
will never enable us to formulate any moral or legal rule. The
most it can do is to furnish future spouses with practical advice
as to whether they should marry at all, what circumstances to
take into account, and what they have to do in order to adjust
themselves to each other. This advice is very valuable, but
whether the spouses must adjust themselves cannot be answered
upon the assumption that marriage is an instrument to achieve
personal happiness. To deduce moral or legal rules from this
assumption seems to be impossible.
Personal happiness is a function of the character as well as
of external circumstances.' It is true, of course, that certain
external circumstances, physical pain for example, make almost
everyone unhappy, but whether a man is happy within the limits
of what one may call the tolerable circumstances depends upon
his character. That is the reason why the achievement, of per-
sonal happiness can be the aim of purposeful action only to a
limited extent. Further, what is happiness? Is it really pos-
sible to treat happiness over a successful fraud or the conceal-
ment of adultery in the same way as happiness over a scientific
discovery? It is not necessary to go further into these prob-
lems of hedonism. So much is clear: Purely subjective
hedonism makes assertions on moral or legal duties of married
life impossible. Only if the notion of happiness is so much
refined that it includes the satisfaction of having fulfilled one's
moral duty is it a possible basis of normative deductions, but if
we assume the existence of moral duties, then we are in fact at
the other position.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is inevitable. A rational solution of the
legal divorce problem must be based on a clear concept of the
moral principles governing marriage. The writer believes that
OR FAILURE IN MARRIAGE (1939) 30, 37. The problems of measuring happiness
and the distinction between objective and subjective tests are analyzed by
Buttenwieser, TERmAx, op. cit. supra note 40, at C. IV.
42 This is the reason why husband and wife often rate the success of
their marriage differently. TERMAN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 368. See
BURGESS AND COTTRELL, op. cit. supra note 41, at 347: "In fact, the trait of
personality which all our items are measuring may turn out to be adjusta-
bility or socialization that makes for adjustment in society, industry, and In
marriage." This is indeed an interesting confession at the end of an objec-
tive scientific sociological analysis. See further Kelly, Marital comvatibility
as Related to Personality Traits of Husbands and Wives as Rated by Self
and Spouse (1941) 13 J. SOCIAL PSYCH. 193.
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such a concept can be found, but he is aware that it can be made
the basis of legislation only if it is accepted by a sufficiently
large part of the population. Here lies the real problem of our
divorce laws. The general moral disintegration which has be-
set the occidental world since 1919 has engulfed the institution
of marriage too. The idea that marriage is a moral institution
has been forgotten, and little agreement exists as to the nature
of the moral duties which marriage imposes. In such a situa-
tion the legislator is more or less condemned to inactivity. He
can and must enforce the rules which are dependent upon the
economic structure of the social body. These rules have been
mentioned above. Beyond that, his efforts to improve the di-
vorce situation would be futile and lead to contradictory and
undesired results. This leads to the conclusion that the state
should not restrict the freedom of divorce except in so far as
the economic system makes this necessary.
It is a great mistake to assume that legal freedom of divorce
is a sign of moral laxity. The ancient Romans allowed.free di-
vorce while at the same time they manifested the deepest under-
standing of the moral nature of marriage. To a Roman jurist
we owe the words which are still the best definition of marriage,
"consortium omnis vitae," and Roman tombstones are eternal
documents of ideal married life. Nor does freedom of legal
divorce mean that a high number of divorces will actually be
obtained. China does not lay legal obstacles in the way of
spouses who seek divorce; yet there are many fewer divorces
there than in the western countries. Now Russia, too, has in-
troduced freedom of divorce; it will be worth-while to watch
this experiment. It is still difficult to ascertain whether the
number of divorces is greater in Russia than in other countries."
If not, the Roman and Chinese views are substantiated. The
most important question which we should investigate in the
Russian experiment is the following: Do the moral forces in-
herent in human nature create a moral concept of marriage if
they are free from legislative interference?
13 CALvWRTON, THE BANKRUPTCY OF MARRIAGE (1928) 264, denies it, but as
he himself acknowledges, upon an insufficient basis of induction.
